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on the theory that the lessor's royalty interest must be protected, with a corollary to
the effect that it was not the expectation of the parties that the lessee would permit
the land to lie dormant with the lease as a perpetual cloud on the title.19 Although
there is no private royalty interest at stake under the grant in the instant case, it
would seem that there remains a public interest which corresponds to the royalty
owner's interest, in that it is to the public's advantage to have petroleum resources
proved up and developed. This interest should be no more subject to the grantee's
inertia that the royalty owner's interest should be subject to the lessee's inertia.
Furthermore, in the case of grants of standing timber, where the grantor has no royalty
interest, courts uniformly hold that unless the timber be removed in a reasonable time,
the grantee's rights in the timber are extinguished.20 This same rule should be applied
to grants of oil and gas.
Patents-Extent of Use of Patent-Use of Tying Agreement Bars Patentee in Infringement Suit-[Federal].-The plaintiff company leased its patented salt-depositing.machines to commercial canners on the condition that they use with these machines only salt tablets, which were unpatented, made by the plaintiff's subsidiary.
The defendant company, which also manufactured unpatented salt tablets, made unpatented depositing machines and leased them to canners. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's machine infringed its patent, and brought suit for an injunction and
v. Consolidated Coal & Oil Corp., ioi W.Va. 721, 133 S.E. 626 (1926), the court quoted
Archer, Law and Practice in Oil and Gas Cases § 28 (191o): "Where a lessee under an oil and
gas lease has not within a reasonable time entered upon the demised premises for the purpose
of exploring for oil and gas, the law presumes an abandonment." Hift v. Henderson, 112
Okla. 194, 240 Pac. 745 (1925); New State Oil & Gas. Co. v. Dunn, 75 Okla. 141, 182 Pac.
514 (1919); Cole v. Butler, io3 Kan. 419, x73 Pac. 978 (I918); Mills v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218,
94 Pac. 142 (I9o8); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Parkhill, ii 4 Ark. 419, i69 S.W. 957 (1914); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911); Barnhart v. Lockwood, 152 Pa.
82, 25 Atl. 237 (1892); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 234 Ky. 217, 27'S.W. (2d)

937 (,930). In Louisiana, a grant or reservation of oil and gas if not exercised for ten years
is lost. See Louisiana Civil Code (Dart, 1942) art. 123.118; Achee v, Caillouett, 197 La. 313,
x S. (2d) 530 (i94i); Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930). In Texas, even

corporeal estates in oil and gas are terminable by abandonment. Stephens County v. MidKansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. i6o, 254 S.W. 290 (1923); Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321,
255 S.W. 6ox (1923); see 3 Summers, Oil and Gas § 459, at 78-80 (perm. ed. 1938). Illinois

courts recognize the principle of abandonment, although no case has been found in which a
lease was actually declared abandoned. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Reichert, 343 Ill. 56o, 566, 175
N.E. 790, 793 (1931); Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N.E. 1o43 (1913)"
19 3 Summers, Oil and Gas §§ 453, 459 (perm. ed. 1938).
2o Couch v. Kahler Co., 199 Ark. 45, 132 S.W. (2d) 648 (i939); Moxley v. Adams, i9o
Ga. 164, 8 S.E. (2d) 525 (194o); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Stevens, io6 Fla. 7,7, 143 So. 661
(1932); Parsons v. Boggie, 139 Ore. 469, Xi P. (2d) 280 (1932); Nelson v. McKinney, 163

Wash. 529, 1 P. (2d) 876 (i93i); Altizer v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 157 Va. i, i6o S.E. 47
(i93i); Joyce v. Gibson, io6 W.Va. 221, 145 S.E. 279 (1928); Rathborne, Hair & Ridgway
Co. v. Coffron, 173 Minn. 452, 217 N.W. 5o (1928); Eastern Kentucky Mineral & Timber
Co. v. Swann-Day Lumber Co., 148 Ky. 82, 146 S.W. 438 (1912); Carson v. Lumber Co.,
io8 Tenn. 681, 69 S.W. 320 (1902); cf. Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. (46), 38 S.E. 26
(I90I).
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an accounting. The district court summarily dismissed the complaint, without considering the issues of validity or infringement, on the ground that the plaintiff was
restraining competition in the sale of unpatented salt tablets., On appeal the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that evidence should have
been considered to determine whether the plaintiff's practice violated Section 3 of the
Clayton Act 2 by substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly
in the unpatented product.s On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held, that the
plaintiff's practice of compelling the lessees of its patented machines to use only its
subsidiary's salt tablets was contrary to public policy and hence that the complaint
should be dismissed. Mortom Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co.4
The Supreme Court has indicated its disapproval of restrictions in licenses or sales
contracts requiring the use of unpatented materials or supplies with patented processes or products. It has refused to entertain either a direct infringement suits against
a licensee or a buyer or a contributory infringement suit 6 against a third party who
furnished unpatented articles to an alleged direct infringer. These decisions may be
explained on the ground that the patentee was barred from prosecuting his infringement suit because the conduct of the patentee had harmed the particular defendant
before the Court. In the instant case, 'however, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed "regardless of whether the particular defendant .... suffered from the misuse
of the patent."? Although the defendant might have been harmed in the sale of its
own tablets "nothing turns on the fact that [it] also competes with [the patentee]
in the sale of the tablets." s The Court explained its dismissal of the complaint as
follows: "It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement
suit in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to
maintain the suit ..... "9
This decision rendered the plaintiff's patent at least temporarily useless. This may
mean that the Court considered the patent void. If this interpretation is followed, a
patentee who uses tying clauses might be liable to anti-trust prosecution for his
monopoly, no longer protected by the patent. 0 On the other hand, the decision may
mean that the patent was still valid although unenforceable, but that the restrictions
zSuppicer Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 31 F. Supp. 876 (Ill. 194o).
2 38 Stat. 731 (x9x5), i5 U.S.C.A. § 14 (i941).
3 Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F. (2d) 968 (C.C.A. 7th 1941).
4 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942).

s Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
6 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (i931); Leitch Mfg.
Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (r938).
7Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 62 S. Ct. 4o2, 4o6 (1942).
8 Ibid., at 4o4.
9 Ibid., at 4o6. The same adverse effect would have followed had this been an action at
law for damages; hence, it appears that the result of the case cannot be explained solely because the patentee elected the wrong remedy.
10 This might be viewed as forcing a choice upon the patentee; he can have either the patent
or the tying clause but not both. By using tying clauses he has sacrificed the patent. But
since the courts have consistently refused to enforce such restrictions the. choice would be
illusory. Notes,5 and 6 supra.
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were invalid. Under the latter interpretation the mere existence of tying clauses will
not render the patentee subject to anti-trust prosecution unless they substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the unpatehted article.'
The patent will remain useless until the "improper practice has been abandoned
2
and .... the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.""1 Although abandonment might seem easily proved, cases already decided suggest problems which will arise in the application of this test. 3 The requirement that the patentee stop exacting promises that licensees, lessees, or buyers of his patent use his
unpatented products might be formally satisfied by'his granting unrestricted licenses
on a royalty basis. But the royalty charge could be set so high that the patentee
would be able to undersell his competitors in the unpatented product and accomplish
the same result as did the abandoned tying clause. Furthermore, proof of the "dissipation" of the "adverse effects upon the public interest" would be especially difficult.
The Court might apply an economic test, the restoration of competitive equilibrium;
x There still remains the possibility both that the patent will be void because of the tying
clauses, should the question arise in a particular case through anti-trust prosecution, and also
that the restrictionswill be void because of the patent, if the question should arise as a defense
to an infringement suit.
The circuit court of appeals held that the plaintiff's tying agreements should not be condemned unless it could be shown that they tended to establish a monopoly or to substantially
restrain competition in the unpatented article. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., U17 F. (2d)
968 (C.C.A. 7th 194x). This argument ignores the fact that the tying clauses are condemned,
not because they have monopolized the unpatented product, in which event the Suppiger Company would be subject to the terms of § 3 of the Clayton Act, but that they have been obtained
through the coercion of the patent grant. Thus, one who sells or leases an unpatented article
can require that only supplies purchased from him be used with the unpatented product insofar
as such practice does not violate the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition or
tending to create a monopoly in the "tied" article. If the buyer or lessee does not like the arrangement he can purchase or lease elsewhere. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463
(1923). But where a patent is involved, the competitive alternative is not available and, even
though the practice may not tend to establish a monopoly or tend to substantially lessen competition in the unpatented article, something less than competitive freedom is the result.
Government counsel has referred to a "twilight zone between the protection afforded by the
anti-trust laws and the proper limits of the patent monopoly," Brief for the United States as
Arnicus Curiae, B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 62 S.Ct. 406 (x942). It cannot now be precisely
stated how far the instant decision extends the power of the Government in anti-trust prosecution. The resolution of the problems in United States v. Masonite Corp., 40 F. Supp. 852
(N.Y. 1941), probable jurisdiction noted 62 S. Ct. 302 (1941), mayclarify the limits of the Government's power.
12Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 62 S.Ct. 402, 405 (942). This matter was not in issue
in the instant case, but in another case decided the same day, B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 62
S. Ct. 406 (1942), the patentee, when denied relief in an infringement suit because the patent
was being used contrary to public policy, offered to give unconditional licenses to all manufacturers on a royalty basis. The Court rejected this offer, holding that the patentee's right
to relief would not be considered until the patentee could "show that it has fully abandoned
its present method of restraining competition in the sale of unpatented articles and that the
consequences of that practice have been fully dissipated." Ibid., at 4o8.
'3 See American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 42 F. Supp. 270, 273 (Ill. 1941); Barber
Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., ii6 F.(2d) 211, 215 (C.C.A. 3 d i94o); B.B.
Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 117 F.(2d) 829, 837 (C.C.A. ist 1941).
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it might fix an arbitrary period of adjustment during which the patentee could charge
no royalty. If the Court should find that the effects of the tying clause could not be
dissipated within the life of the patent, virtual forfeiture of the grant would result.'4
Apparently the Court intended to leave these requirements vaguely defined.
Although the Court employed the traditional statement,s that the use of a tying
clause is not within the "scope of the monopoly" granted by the patent, z6 its use of the
"public interest" and "public policy" terminology may foreshadow a new emphasis
in patent cases. The Court once considered clauses requiring that remote buyers use
7
only the patentee's unpatented supplies to be within the scope of the patent.
But today it considers such restrictions upon even an immediate lessee or licensee
beyond the scope of the patent monopoly.'$ Similarly, restrictions as to selling price,9
use, 20 time,2z quantity,22 and place's have been described as "within the scope of the
patent monopoly." The courts have limited these rules. For example, when a sale
has intervened between the user of the patent and the patentee such restrictions are
4
beyond the scope of the patent grant.'
Many of the patent cases, which have been widely followed, are now of dubious
authority. The consequences of the broad privileges formerly allowed under the patent
monopoly and the failure of the legislature to amend the patent statute's have been
'4 In a recent consent decree, a patent was forfeited without payment to the patentee.
United States v. Kearney &Trecker Corp., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 52,644 (D.C. 11. 1941).
'S For an historical analysis of the problems, see Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise,
TNEC Monograph No. 31 (1941); Meyers and Lewis, The Patent "Franchise" and the

Antitrust Laws, 3o Georgetown L.J. Ix7, 26o (1941-42); Oberdorfer, "Tying Clauses" and
the Patent Monopoly, 7 Ohio St.L.J. 210 (194i); Callmann, Patent License Agreements be-

tween Competitors and the Monopoly Issue, 28 Georgetown L.J. 871 (i94o); Feuer, The
Patent Monopoly and the Anti-trust Laws, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1145 (1938); A Possible Extension
of the Scope of the Patent Monopoly, 48 Yale L. J. o89 (1939); The Scope of the Patent
Monopoly: Control of Supplies and Accessories and Restrictions on Use, 52 Harv. L. Rev.
3o8 (1938).
"6Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 62 S. Ct. 402, 404 (1942),
'7 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
" Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (I917).
9United States v. Gen'l Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
20Gen'l Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 17s (1938), aff'd on rehearing 305 U.S.

X24

(1938).

" Mitchell v. Hawley, z6 Wall. (U.S.) 544 (1872).
-Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697 (C.C. N.J. 1887).
23Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 788 (i869).
24Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913). On occasion, the sales concept has been
narrowly confined so as to escape the consequences of this doctrine. United States v. Gen'l
Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Patentees have attempted ingenious arrangements to avoid
this rule. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 3 U.S. 49 0 (1917); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436 (194o).
2S29 Stat. 692 (1897), 35 U.S.C.A. § 31 (1940). In 1912 the first attempt was made to
modify the statute through a compulsory licensing bill, H.R. 23417, H.R. Rep. 1161, 62d
Cong. 2d Sess. (1912). Senator King of Utah presented a bill in 1935 requiring compulsory
licensing of patents which were not put to use. S.383, 7 4 th Cong. ist Sess. (1935). Again, in
1937 a compulsory licensing bill was proposed by Representative W. D. McFarlane of Texas,
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6
the subject of recent widespread criticism.2 The critics contend that the present patent
system defeats the constitutional purpose "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." They view the "poor inventor" as a myth hiding corporate interests
27
which have, by suppression of patents, patent-pooling, and restrictive licenses, prevented any approximation of the competitive ideal. Perhaps these critics have the
28
ear of the Supreme Court. In a recent infringement suit, Mr. Justice Douglas cited
29
with approval Professor Walton H. Hamilton's Patents and Free Enterprise and applied a strict test in the determination of the issue of patentability. The recent
vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Black, in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
urging that the Court should on its own initiative examine the issue of patentability3o
suggests that the test applied in the instant case may be extended beyond the situations involving tying clauses. If the patent grant is limited by "a public policyadopted
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. . . .,' "3 many practices which have been condoned may be condemned.32

Receivers-Priorities-Debts Due United States Preferred over Wage Claims[United States].-A Missouri bank was insured by the FHA against losses from loans
made in accordance with Title I of the National Housing Act. A corporation obtained
H.R. 9259, 7Sth Cong. 3d Sess. (z938); the bill is set forth and discussed in 83 Cong. Rec.
4327 (1938). The final recommendations of the TNEC, that restrictions on price, output,
geographical areas, and use should be illegal, and that licensing should be compulsory, have
not as yet been presented in a formal bill. TNEC, Final Report and Recommendations 36
(1941).
26 Hamilton, op. cit. supra note i5; Meyers and Lewis, op. cit. supra note i5; Borkin,
Patents and the New Trust Problem, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 74 (i94o); Feuer, The Patent
Privilege and the TNEC Proposals, 14 Temple L.Q. i8o (i94o); Schechter, Would Compulsory
Licensing of Patents Be Unconstitutional?, 22 Va. L. Rev. 287 (1936); see 83 Cong. Rec. 4327
(1938).
'7 An early case, Hoe v. Knap, 27 Fed. 204 (C.C. Ill i886), held that a patentee did not
have the right to suppress his patent but that he was "bound either to use the patent himself
or allow others to use it on reasonable or equitable terms ..... " This view was abandoned in
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (C.C.A. 6th
x896), where it was held that the position in Hoe v. Knap was "not supported by reason or
authority," knd that since the right to suppress includes the "lesser" right of allowing others
to use conditionally, a tying clause requiring the licensee to use only supplies furnished by
the patentee with the patented machine was valid. Although the Button-Fastener case has
been overruled in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917), the proposition that the patentee can suppress has survived. See Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931). The current attacks by the
courts upon patent abuses have been directed at the conditions imposed rather than at the
original premise that a patentee can suppress his patent.
28 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 62 S. Ct. 37 (194I).
'9 TNEC Monograph No. 31 (1941).
3o Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 62 S. Ct. 513 (1942).

3' Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 62 S. Ct.

402,

405

(1942).

32 It is conceivable that there will be a return to the doctrine of Hoe v. Knap, 27 Fed. 2o4

(C.C. Ill. 1886), since suppression may be at least as inimical to the public interest as are
tying clauses.

